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SECTION I. OUTSOURCING, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
COVERAGE AND FACILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 
 
 
1. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE  
 
Some of the major problems about outsourcing practices increase are related to 
collective bargaining coverage. In many cases, outsourced workers are covered by 
different collective agreements than internal workers or even do not have any type 
of coverage, as the case of the dependent self-employed persons. Relations between 
clients and provider companies frequently make external workers secondary, 
getting worse in the case outsourced workers are not involved in the main activity 
of the client organizations. This growing weakness may generate uncertainties 
concerning employment stability in cases of business transfers. In this regard, the 
"Transfers of Undertakings Directive" (2001) was approved by the European 
Commission in 2001 to guarantee not only the durability of existing contracts prior 
to a transfer of companies, but also the permanency of conditions of those contracts. 
In the case of Spain, this directive drove the reform of Article 44 of the Workers' 
Statute in 2002, including new features such as requirements of the continuity of 
the employment relation and the contractual content; and the subrogation in the 
pension commitments and, in general, as many obligations in matters of 
complementary social protection have been acquired (Desdentado 2002) . This 
regulatory change promoted the introduction of subrogation clauses in sectoral 
collective agreements, referring to the employer's obligation to maintain employees 
in cases of transfer of undertakings in outsourced activities. 
Thus, 19,68% of collective agreements and 22,77% of workers throughout the labor 
market were covered by subrogation clauses in 2015 (Ministerio de Empleo y 
Seguridad Social 2015), confirming importance of outsourcing phenomenon in 
Spain. In this way, this subrogation clause (result of the social dialogue) gives on 
stability to workers generally with precarious trajectories through collective 
agreements coverage. 
At local level, it is worth mentioning the case of the Barcelona City Council, which 
carries out a social evaluation of its suppliers to take in consideration also social 
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criteria beyond only economic issues (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2016). Thus, 
supplier companies can be excluded if the City Council detects that the price offered 
is unusually low (and therefore implies the payment of wages below the collective 
agreement). Likewise, other minimum criteria regarding the stability and wages of 
workers are also applied. 
 
1.1. Main characteristics of the collective bargaining structure and 
predominant level 
 
Before economic crisis, Spanish collective bargaining system was very coordinated, 
prioritizing sectoral level and setting determined issues at lower levels (generally 
regional). Thus, collective bargaining at company level was limited to activities 
without sectoral agreement or to develop aspects that sectoral negotiation 
attributed to the company's level actors (e.g.  Improving sectoral conditions) 
(Fundación 1º de Mayo 2017). 
Once it started economic crisis, labor reforms of 2010 and, mainly, 2012 granted 
application priority to the collective bargaining company level instead of sectoral 
in the regulation of certain key issues such as wages and working time (Pastor 
2014).  In 2014, the number of new company agreements (most of them in SMEs 
and micro companies) tripled compared to previous years (Górriz 2015). Likewise, 
labor reform made more flexible opting out possibilities for collective agreements. 
All this means "an important brake on the pace of negotiation, with a loss of 
coverage of companies and workers (Alós, Beneyto and Jódar 2017). Therefore, "the 
Spanish collective bargaining system seems to represent a case of decentralized 
negotiation that is potentially tending to become a disorganized negotiation" 
(Fundación 1º de Mayo 2017). 
In brief, Spain is experiencing a stage of erosion of collective bargaining processes 
(Molina and Miguélez 2016), impacting over the balance of power in the Industrial 
Relations system.  Therefore, “trade unions find themselves in a delicate situation 
having lost significant degrees of their structural power in the deregulated labour 
market, and of their institutional power as a social agent in concertation 
arrangements” (Köhler 2018). 
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1.2.  Collective bargaining coverage: trends, extension mechanisms and 
gaps 
 
One of the key elements to improve employment quality is the participation of 
social actors (particularly workers' representatives) in determining their own 
working conditions (Ruesga, Pérez and Viñas 2011). Thus, collective bargaining 
is associated with better wages, better job stability for employees and more 
equality (Visser 2016). Likewise, countries with greater union density and with a 
greater role of collective bargaining tend more to improve quality of work 
(Ruesga et al. 2011). Thus, collective bargaining is a key stone in shaping 
employment. However, this role has declined during the crisis period in Spain 
(Molina and Miguélez 2013) and Europe (Visser, Hayter and Gammarano 2015), 
being urgent to take it up again through mechanisms such as coverage to 
counteract growing inequalities in employment (Visser et al. 2015) such as 
disparity between internal and external workers. 
In this way, coverage of both collective bargaining and agreements becomes 
fundamental mechanism for the employment configuration. We understand the 
coverage as the number of workers covered by a sectoral collective agreement in 
relation to the number of workers potentially covered in that sector (Pérez Infante 
2011). In Spain, the coverage rate has remained around 80% since the beginning 
of 2000’s (Graph 1). During economic crisis, coverage rate slightly increased to 
81,41% (2009) due to the greater proportion of "insiders" within the labor force, 
remaining currently stable at 77,5%. 
Graph 1. Coverage rate and Union density evolution in Spain (1977-2013). 
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Source: ICTWSS (2018) 
However, there are several reliability problems regarding information provided 
by collective agreements commission members in Spain (Pérez Infante, 2011): 
 Partial view: data collected is only related to current collective agreements, so 
extended agreements after their end are automatically excluded. It is also 
general that data provided by Collective agreements commission members 
informs only about agreements in their first year of implementation. 
 Poor data: Data provided to Collective agreements commission members 
about number of companies and workers covered in their sectors is generally 
poor.  
 Duplication problems: the numbers of workers and companies covered can 
be duplicated when one company is affected by agreements of different level 
(e.g. company agreement and regional sectoral agreement). 
Even so, this graph it’s useful to compare to other European countries: from 
9,89% in Lithuania to 98% in Belgium and France, Spain is above the EU average 
(52.85%) (ICTWSS, 2018). This is due mainly to Erga Omnes principle: the 
universality of the Spanish system makes that collective agreements affect to all 
workers even those not affiliated to any trade union either working in companies 
not members of an employer organization participant in the bargaining process. 
This high coverage rate contrasts with a low union density: 16,88% in 2013 
(Graph 1), below the European average (24%). Spanish legislation requires to 
workers' organizations to be sufficiently representative to participate in collective 
bargaining processes. This means to have at least 10% of the total union 
representatives elected by the workers within the scope of the negotiation of the 
agreement. On the contrary, business associations must demonstrate that they 
represent at least 10% of the companies and that they employ at least 10% of the 
workers within the scope of the agreement (Martínez-Matute 2016). 
Despite the high coverage rate of collective bargaining, there are situations in 
which it is not clear whether workers are covered by collective bargaining. This 
is the case of several types of temporary workers (e.g. Temporary Agency 
Workers), for which collective agreements that may cover them do not mention 
their contractual figures (Martínez-Matute 2016). Likewise, other workers are 
automatically excluded from collective bargaining as dependent self-employed 
workers. In other cases, we find situations in which workers are covered, but by 
a collective agreement that does not correspond to them due to the activity and / 
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or occupation they perform. This is one of the most common scenarios for 
outsourced workers working for supplier companies (e.g. Facility Management 
Companies). 
 
2. THE EXTENSION, REGULATION AND FORMS OF OUTSOURCING 
 
The outsourcing is a growing process in Spain since the 90s with the beginning of 
the privatization of the public sector and the decentralization of production and 
services in the private sector. Nowadays, the 30% of Spanish companies are 
involved in outsourcing processes (European Company Survey 2013). 
Considering their economic importance, around 90% of companies with a 
turnover of more than 12 million euros have already outsourced their ancillary 
activities, reducing to 70% for companies with revenues above 3 million euros 
(Gabinete Técnico de Acción Sindical UGT 2018). We understand that outsourcing 
has become a key mechanism to reduce costs during the period of economic crisis. 
In particular, Public Administration outsources the 8,66% of its labor costs, raising 
to the 47,72% considering potential outsourced labor costs (Godino 2017). 
Therefore, both for public and private organizations, outsourcing has become a 
key tool to reduce costs during the crisis. However, it is not only an economic 
issue. Outsourcing is another tool to increase flexibility and to transfer the risk of 
labor conflicts to external organizations. In this way, the greater adaptability, 
performance and lower labor cost of the employees in these supplier companies 
consequently improves the productivity of the client organizations, which focus 
on their core activities. 
There are no databases differentiating internal and external workers in Spain. 
Nevertheless, taking into account the data of those sectors where there is a greater 
penetration of outsourcing in companies, we find that the main forms of 
outsourcing in Spain are the supplier companies (with a growing importance of 
facility management companies), the temporary agency workers and the 
dependent self-employed workers (with a significant increase in qualified 
professions). 
 
2.1. The regulatory framework 
One of the most common outsourcing scenarios takes place when one 
organization (whether public administrations or private companies) decides to 
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outsource certain activities, announcing a call for tenders. Generally, economic 
issues offered by potential provider companies are the most valued by client 
organizations, with several risks for the stability and economic security of 
outsourced workers. European legislation regulates on the rights of employees 
in situations of change of employer has existed since 1977 in the so-called 
"Acquired Rights Directive" (Council Directive 77/187 of 14 February 1977). Since 
then, social dialogue mechanisms have developed more in this field, highlighting 
mainly the "Transfers of Undertakings Directive" (Council of the European Union 
2001), subsequently articulated in the different Member States. These directives 
were mainly responsible for ensuring not only the continuity of existing contracts 
prior to a succession of companies, but also the conditions of those contracts, 
entrusting this to each Member State introducing it into their corresponding 
regulatory frameworks. 
In the case of Spain, this directive was adapted in 2002 in the review of Article 44 
of the Workers' Statute, with new features such as "the requirement of the validity 
of the relation and the content of the work contract regarding the maintenance of 
labor relations; the subrogation in pension commitments and, in general, as many 
obligations in matters of complementary social benefits and protection acquired 
(Desdentado 2002). In this regard, this supposed a gradual introduction of 
subrogation clauses in the set of sectoral collective agreements, regarding to the 
employer's obligation to maintain employees in cases of succession of companies 
in outsourced services. 
Graph 2. Clauses on subrogation and on outsourcing in Spain (2012-2015). 
 
Source: Estadística de Convenios Colectivos de Trabajo (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, 
2015). 
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Thus, 19.68% of collective agreements and 22,77% of workers throughout the 
labor market during 2015 were covered by subrogation clauses (Graph 2), 
indicating the relevance of outsourcing phenomenon in the Spanish labor 
market. In this regard, the protection that the subrogation mechanism gives to 
workers' stability generates particular situations in which generally precarious 
jobs and workers with work insecurity trajectories have security regarding the 
length of their employment relation. 
 
2.2.  The extension of outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing was already a prominent phenomenon since the early 1980s in the 
industry worldwide and, specifically, in Spain, especially in the manufacturing 
sector (Martínez, Vela, De Luís and Pérez 2010). During the 90s and, moreover, 
since the beginning of the 2000s, outsourcing became an incipient practice also in 
the service sector, both internationally and in Spain (Guerra, Macía and Delgado 
2006). Thus, this phenomenon concerns not only blue collar activities, but, in this 
new wave of outsourcing, has an effect on occupations traditionally considered 
white collar. 
Graph 3. Percentage of Spanish companies partly or entirely outsourcing according to 
economic activity. 
 
Source: European Company Survey (2013). 
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shows that 31,70% of the organizations surveyed in Spain have developed 
outsourcing processes in some part of their functions. Regarding the sectors, we 
find higher levels in the industry (38%, 54,60% in Construction and 34,60% in 
industrial sector) than in services (28%, 26,20% in Hospitality and Catering and 
26,90% in other services) (Graph 3). 
The sectoral characteristics explains the difference: services tend to be ancillary 
functions in other economic activities, which increases their possibilities to be 
outsource, while in the services sector there are suppliers companies. There is an 
exception with the Financial Services and Real State sector (42,60% of outsourcing 
level), a diverse sector impacted during the crisis that implemented important 
restructuring changes, being outsourcing one of its strategies. 
Regarding the Public sector, in the case of Spain the European Company Survey 
(2013) registers a 0% of outsourcing level. However, 31% of public organizations 
implement outsourcing practices. In that sense, we find a possible bias in the 
answers of Spanish public employers when categorizing outsourcing processes. 
In this regard, access to statistically representative data on outsourcing in Spain 
is limited, even more regarding public administration. However, one recent 
research analyses the general budgets of the public administration, measuring 
the proportion that is dedicated to outsourced services in relation to what is 
dedicated to internal labor costs (Godino 2017). It is remarkable to note that the 
general level of outsourcing for the Spanish Public Administration is 8,66%. A 
figure that increases to 47,72% if we attend to operational levels of outsourcing, 
that is, in relation to those activities and functions that are prone to be 
outsourced. 
Likewise, following the analysis of Kirchner (2015), we can locate those 
companies in which outsourcing is carried out on-site or off-site, thus, if the 
outsourced activities are still carried out in the work centre of the client 
organization or in their supplier company facilities. This creates a typology 
differentiating between partial outsourcing and complete outsourcing, finding 
that 75% of Spanish companies that outsource, they do it partially (similar 
percentage to the 75% in Europe). Therefore, we detect a majority of outsourcing 
processes that generate scenarios in which suppliers develop their activity in the 
client's space. In other words, the situation in which workers who have 
previously had a direct employment relationship with a company, once they 
have outsourced the activity they develop, is now a service relationship between 
clients and suppliers. 
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Regarding firm size, we find a positive correlation between size and outsourcing 
level (Graph 4). This figure can be interpreted in two ways: on one hand, those 
organizations that reach a certain size are more likely to face dilemmas such as 
focusing on core activities and to outsource ancillary activities. On the other 
hand, we can find an interaction effect between explanatory variables, since 
industrial activities tend to concentrate larger companies. 
Graph 5a. Level of outsourcing in Spanish companies according to firm size. 
 
Source: European Company Survey (2013). 
In regard to variables referring to the characteristics of employees, there is a 
tendency for a higher education level of employees in those organizations that 
outsource (in this case, a higher proportion of workers with a university degree) 
(Graph 5). This can be result of a composition effect: occupations that are mostly 
outsourced within organizations are those that develop ancillary activities, 
usually occupied by employees with medium and low educational levels. 
Graph 5b. Level of outsourcing in Spanish companies according to proportion of 
workforce with university degree. 
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Source: European Company Survey (2013). 
With regard to the proportion of women, their influence on the level of 
outsourcing does not seem relevant (Graph 6), unless for a slight tendency to 
have more women in those organizations with lower levels of outsourcing. 
However, it is relevant to highlight that, on the other side of organizations 
(supplier companies), it is common to find feminized workforces (Godino 2017). 
Graph 6. Level of outsourcing in Spanish companies according to proportion of women. 
 
Source: European Company Survey (2013). 
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different regulations for the Spanish context. 
 
2.2.1. Supplier companies 
As already highlighted (section 2.1), the model of supplier companies providing 
certain services, both to public and private organizations, is the most common 
form of outsourcing in Spain. Data collected by the European Company Survey 
(Graph 3) refers mostly to this outsourcing model (enhancing its impact up to 
31,70% of Spanish companies). Negotiation processes between client and 
supplier organizations frequently give to employees a minor role. This practice 
is increased when outsourced services are not part of the core activity of the client 
company. This scenario generates important uncertainties in the field of 
employment stability, since, if every certain period of time the supplier company 
changes, workers linked to that service can do so. In that sense, subrogation 
clauses (described in section 2.1) is the most important protection mechanism for 
employees in this this form of outsourcing. 
 
2.2.2. Temporary Agency Work 
Temporary Agency Work was approved in 1994 in Spain, growing since then up 
to around 16,20% of the total contracts in 2016 (Graph 7), showing its importance 
in the Spanish economy. The relative use of TAW has increased during the crisis 
(10% in 2010 and 10,6 in 2013), although its total numbers decreased (as the 
number of contracts in the whole economy). However, it remains one of the main 
risks of vulnerability for temporary agency workers: the very short length of 
contracts (Molina, Godino and Rodriguez 2017).  
Graph 7. Number of Contracts in the total economy comparing to number of Temporary 
Agency Workers and Self-employed. 
 
Source: Ministry of Employment (2017). 
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Temporary agency work is generally occupied by young people: 58,4% of TA 
Workers were below 25 years old during 2017 (Ministry of Employment 2018). 
The Spanish employer association of TAW companies argues that this 
employment model represents an opportunity for training to young people to 
launch their professional career (ASEMPLEO 2016). However, the number of 
TAW contracts in 20117 dedicated to apprenticeship, training and internship 
represents less than 0,1 of these contracts (Ministry of Employment 2018). 
Regarding the economic sectors of client organizations, TAW contracts are 
mostly in manufacture industry (29%), agriculture (18%), transport (14%) and 
hotels (14%) (Graph 8). These sectors are quiet opposite to main client sectors for 
supplier companies (Graph 3), implying there is a sectoral trend to use one or 
another type of outsourcing, but also it is explained by the transfer of clients from 
TAW to Facility Management services (as explained in section 3). 
About its regulation, TAW has been reformed several times: initially to equalize 
working conditions of Temporary Agency Workers and internal workers; more 
recently to wide the scope of economic sectors and activities where TA workers 
could operate (Law 35/2010) (Molina, Godino y Rodriguez, 2017). TAW in Spain 
has its own collective agreement. The negotiation of the VIth National Sectoral 
Agreement was conflict oriented, implying the intervention of public mediators 
(Interconfederal Service of Mediation and Arbitration - SIMA), whose presence 
changed the social actors interlocutors position. The negotiation was marked by 
the expectation of a quantitative extension of TAW as well as an increase in 
profitability by TAW companies thanks to the new regulation included in Law 
356/2010. This has led to an increase in those working conditions contemplated 
in the collective agreement covering employees in the client company, which will 
be equalized for TA workers (Molina, Godino and Rodriguez 2017). 
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Graph 8. Sectoral distribution of client organizations of Temporary Agency Workers. 
 
Source: Ministry of Employment (2017). 
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Graph 9. Employed persons being self-employed without employees as a share of all 
persons in employment 
 
Source: Eurostat 2018 
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3. FACILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 
 
Facility Management Companies offer a wide range of services that generally are 
not part of the core activity of client organizations. Currently, FMCs are 
increasingly offering comprehensive services to supply all the outsourced services 
of a client organization (cleaning, contract catering, security, contact centre, etc.). 
It is difficult to distinguish the beginning of FM phenomenon in Spain since it 
represents an extension of the common pattern of supplier companies. Anyway, 
first FM firms started being construction companies offering parallel cleaning and 
security services. The increasing of FMCs in Spain is linked with the decrease of 
other type of outsourcing: Temporary Agency Work (Gabinete Técnico de 
FeSMC-UGT 2016). Once TAW is gradually more regulated and temporary 
agency workers tend to be equally treated to internal workers, it is not profitable 
anymore for client organizations. Therefore, the aim of reduction of labor costs is 
leading to clients to turn to FM services. 
 
3.1. Regulation, development and collective bargaining of Facility 
Management in Spain 
 
A factor that has contributed to the rise of Facility Management is the lack of 
adequacy of regulations to this phenomenon, contributing to the proliferation of 
companies whose competitiveness is based on prices reduction of supplied 
services. In addition, 2012 labor reform deteriorated this situation, giving priority 
to company level agreements. Therefore, many companies started to have their 
own agreement in order to downgrade employment conditions settled at sectoral 
level. 
However, the Spanish Justice system responded cancelling 47 facility management 
collective agreements at company level until in 2017. These cancellations are mainly 
based on non-compliance with the correspondence principle, requiring that 
workers representatives of a company that bargain an agreement must represent 
the entire workforce and not just one or several work centres. 
Even so, last studies registers 273 company level agreements in FM firms, 55 of 
them at national level, covering around 60.000 workers in Spain (Gabinete Técnico 
de Acción Sindical UGT 2018). Regarding economic activity registered, these 
agreements register 15 different NACEs (e.g. 55 in Support activities to firms, 33 in 
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Comprehensive services to Facilities or 23 in Industrial cleaning). 
 
Graph 10. Facility Management collective agreements at company level regarding 
NACEs distribution in Spain (2017) 
 
Source: Gabinete Técnico de Acción Sindical UGT (2018) 
This disparity shows the difficulty to regulate FM phenomena, and to organise 
workers representatives, implying high coordination between sectoral federations. 
Largest Spanish unions have established already internal commissions to improve 
knowledge, monitoring and control of every issue related to FM companies, 
particularly regarding collective bargaining. 
Currently, the FM scenario in Spain is characterized mainly by a small number 
of large companies at national level, but also a large and diverse set of small 
businesses at regional and local level. These companies are not formally 
organised as social actor, although some largest companies in the FM business 
maintain non-formal meetings in order to launch an own employer association 
to, consequently, promote sectoral collective bargaining for these companies. 
This was a project in common with the TAW companies. During the crisis the 
TAW firms lowered a lot in profits and some of them established parallel 
companies that, together with many FM companies and allowed by the Labor 
law reform 2012, signed collective agreements at company level to outsource 
production. Not only intensive activities, but technical profiles such as IT and 
administrative activities. 
All these company agreements that were signed had formal defects, so unions 
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appealed to justice courts, wining all the processes (50 agreements have been 
blocked). However, the companies continued to apply these cancelled 
agreements, so public labor inspection organisms had to intervene. At that time, 
companies began to step back and sought a sectoral collective bargaining with 
unions. To articulate this negotiation process, the companies had to organize 
themselves as an association. Initially, main unions supported the initiative to 
improve the worsening of FM employees working conditions, who usually 
have lower wages than those established in sectoral agreements. However, 
finally unions retracted, because when all is said and done company level 
supremacy derogation is the mechanism to reverse this scenario. Last 
consultations made doubt that this association is still active. 
Not only unions, but paradoxically others employers as the main TAW firm in 
Spain (Adecco) has officially criticized FMCs practices, arguing they make the 
outsourced services supplying business less competitive in the sense that the 
difference in the provision of a service should not be in the salary, but in the added 
value. They maintain that FM companies should pay according to sectoral 
agreements, trying to avoid dumping (El País 2017). 
In that way, collective bargaining system is gradually introducing clauses 
regulating outsourcing aimed to be adequate instruments to solve the problem of 
the determination of the collective agreement applicable to FM workers (Graph 3) 
a, but also to become a device that discourages outsourcing, and in particular FM 
use, since it can limit the possible application of company level agreements 
worsening sectoral employment agreements (Palomo 2018). 
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SECTION II. CASE STUDIES 
 
 
1. CHAMBERMAIDS: THE HIDDEN FACE OF TOURIMS 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The tourism sector has always been an important engine for the Spanish economy, 
always behind the construction. However, once getting out of the economic crisis, 
the tourism has become the first sector of the Spanish economy, representing 10,2% 
of total GDP (CNE 2017) and 12,7% of total employment (EPA 2017), also 
promoting other sectors such as trade, transport and the agro-food industry. Within 
tourism, the hotels sector has a key role. After being one of the sectors that suffered 
most from the economic crisis due to the reduction of spending on leisure, the 
hospitality industry has begun to recover in parallel with the boom in the franchise 
economy in the sector (Asociación Española de Franquiciadores 2018). 
Within employment in the hotel sector, the service of preparation and cleaning of 
rooms (composed by governesses, supervisors, valets and chambermaids) is 
estimated to represent between 25 and 30% of employees (Cañada 2016). These data 
are in line with EPA microdata, which point to 33,1% in 2016 (EPA 2018), around 
69.000 in all of Spain. This data is obtained from the crossing between the economic 
activity "Hotels and similar accommodations" and the occupation "Personnel 
cleaning offices, hotels and other similar establishments". Social agents, both 
business and social-union, agree in considering this activity one of the pillars of the 
sector, being one of the services most valued by guests. 
Thus, the situation of this activity is paradoxical: while the tourism business (and 
specifically hotels) has improved in recent years, the employment situation of 
chambermaids has worsened, especially generating serious occupational health 
problems (mainly musculoskeletal injuries, stress problems and anxiety, giving rise 
to high numbers of sick leave) and severe salary reductions (UITA-UTHGRA 2015, 
CCOO Servicios and UGT-FeSMC 2014, Cañada 2016). 
For hotel companies in Spain, the main challenge of the sector is competitiveness 
(being profitable in relation to quality-price), in addition to customer loyalty. The 
business representatives of the sector point out that this profitability is achieved by 
efficiently managing the workers. However, the economic improvement of the 
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sector coincides with the effects of the labor reform of 2012, which promoted the 
application of company agreements with worse conditions as well as the promotion 
of employment outsourcing practices, especially relevant in the case of 
chambermaids. 
 
1.2. Social actors 
 
At national level, main trade union organizations in the representation of workers 
in hotels are: 
 Federation of Services of Workers Commissions (Federación de Servicios de 
Comisiones Obreras - FeS-CC.OO.). Services is the main federation of 
CC.OO. next to Industry. Within it, hotel activity is central, having its own 
area. 
 The Federation of Services, Mobility and Consumption of the General Union 
of Workers (Federación de Servicios, Movilidad y Consumo de la Unión 
General de Trabajadores - UGT-SMC), which has an area organized for 
Media and Culture (also with a group specifically for journalism). 
Both federations have promoted significant mobilizations during the crisis in 
relation to the denunciation of collective agreements of companies, in addition to 
endorsing and publishing various studies in relation to the impact of outsourcing 
in hotels and the occupational health of chambermaids. During the years of crisis, 
the association "Las Kellys" (as a diminutive and pun on “las que limpian” (those 
who clean")) has emerged. This network of chambermaids has taken relevance 
progressively since 2015, with an important media exposure that has allowed them 
to denounce their situation and expose in public opinion the consequences of 
outsourcing. Currently they have a network present in the main tourist territories 
of Spain. Since 2016 they are constituted as an association. From disagreements 
with the main unions (e.g. divergences in the negotiation of collective agreements 
such as the one in Catalonia, negotiated by CC.OO. and UGT, but finally signed 
only by UGT due to their denounce), "The Kellys" decided to organize as union 
section of the CNT (National Confederation of Workers) union. 
Although the claims of "Las Kellys" are practically identical to those of CC.OO. 
and UGT, the group of chambermaids argues that no agreement in the sector 
should be signed without an express prohibition of outsourcing practices. On the 
contrary, the strategy of CC.OO. and UGT has focused more on the introduction 
of clauses that ensure the application of the agreement of the sector, that is, the 
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equalization of rights of outsourced workers. 
The affiliation of the chambermaids is relatively low, nevertheless, it is the 
occupation with greater affiliation in the sector. Likewise, since 2012 there has 
been an important increase in the affiliation of the chambermaids as well as the 
number of women in the workers committees. However, fear is the main obstacle 
to the affiliation of workers in the sector, especially for outsourced employees. 
With regard to employers representation, CEHAT (Spanish Confederation of 
Hotels and Tourist Accommodation) is made up of the majority of hotel 
associations of local or provincial level distributed throughout the Spanish 
geography, as well as four sub-sectorial ones at national level (54 in total). CEHAT 
represents the entire Spanish accommodation sector (hotels, tourist apartments, 
spas and campsites). From the territorial associations are managed all those 
questions that are related to the corresponding geographical and administrative 
scope. For those issues that demand a unique representation and interlocution at 
national level, the Confederation exercises its representation on the sector as a 
whole. 
The social actors that signed the last sectorial agreement at national level (CC.OO. 
and UGT in the workers representation side and CEHAT in the employer 
associations’ side) meet monthly to discuss and update aspects related to the 
sector, so communication is fluid. About their relationship, the business actor 
points out a cordial relationship despite accusations of abusive practices in 
relation to outsourcing. For their part, the unions believe that CEHAT does not 
really represent the main companies in the sector, which negotiate on their own 
provincial or company agreements. 
 
1.3. Outsourcing in Hotels: the impact on chambermaids 
It is complex to establish an exact percentage of the level of outsourcing in 
chambermaids. However, social agents consulted estimate that around 80% of this 
occupation is outsourced in Spain, a figure that was much lower before the crisis. 
The Facility Management Companies are the predominant form of outsourcing, not 
only with chambermaids’ services but general cleaning, catering, security and even 
reception desk services in Hotels, with a high percentage of temporary and part-
time contracts (Graph 11 and 12). 
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Graph 11. Type of contract in Hotels workers, Chambermaids and total economy (2016) 
 
Source: Microdata from EPA (Encuesta de Población Activa) 
 
Graph 12. Share of part-time contracts in Hotels workers, Chambermaids and total 
economy (2016) 
 
Source: Microdata from EPA (Encuesta de Población Activa) 
The representatives of hotel companies argue that there are tasks that have always 
been outsourced in the hospitality industry (maintenance, IT services, etc.): "The 
outsourcing of chambermaid worries us as much as that of a IT specialist". 
However, from CC.OO. they consider that the comparison is not accurate due to 
the central and structural nature that the activity of the chambermaids has for the 
hotels, thus denouncing their fraudulent use. 
Regarding the motivators of outsourcing, business representatives argue mainly 
that outsourcing allows greater flexibility, understood by the combination of an 
increase in profitability and adaptability. Thus, they point out that "hotels that 
outsource do so because each day they have a different occupancy rate, so 
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outsourcing is a mechanism of adjustment to demand (varying the time in advance 
to request external workers according to the agreement between the hotel company 
and the company provider). 
The employers representation highlight that "the challenge with outsourcing is that 
the client does not know which employee is internal and which is external", that is, 
that the quality of services provided by both types of employees must be the same, 
but with diverse employment conditions. In that sense, many hotels keep the 
governess as an internal worker to manage the rest of (outsourced) chambermaids, 
so maintaining the company's policy. Trade unions see the other side of the story 
as saying that companies in the sector are currently basing their business model on 
social dumping. That is, increasing the profit margin at the expense of a general 
worsening in the working conditions in the sector, with special incidence in the 
most numerous and weakest group: chambermaids. 
To that respect, a study on the impact of outsourcing in Spanish hotels (Cañada 
2016) highlights some of the main consequences for chambermaids and other 
occupations in hotels: 1) Arbitrariness with collective agreements and coverage for 
cleaning agreements at company level agreements (Facility Management 
Companies) rather than Hotels sectoral agreement. This usually means substantial 
salary and professional category reductions. 2) Less stability and insecurity about 
hours and days of work. 3) Workload intensification. 4) Health and safety 
problems. 5) Loss of quality of service and risk of de-professionalization. 6) 
Segmentation, division and increased competition among hotel staff. 7) Weakening 
of trade unions power to defend their interests. In this sense, the generalized impact 
of outsourcing on employment conditions and relations arises mainly as a 
consequence of the arbitrary application of collective agreements. 
 
1.3.1. Collective bargaining practices in hotels 
The fifth collective agreement for hotels sector (V Acuerdo Laboral de ámbito 
estatal para el sector de hostelería 2015, also known as ALEH) is bargained at 
national level, working as general framework for agreements at regional and local 
level. This national agreement covers aspects such as the delimitation of the sector, 
professional quaifications and employment contracts, while the wage-setting and 
aspects related to social rights and benefits are negotiated at the regional or local 
level. 
Despite the relevance of outsourcing phenomena in the sector, the agreement does 
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not deal with this topic at national level. However, some regional agreements 
settle limits to outsourcing practices. This is the case of the Balearic Islands, 
Cantabria, Jaén, Las Palmas, Malaga, Seville and Tenerife agreements, which have 
introduced that in case of outsourcing, it is mandatory to apply the hotel contract 
to outsourced workers. Thus, there are success cases like Baleares, where the 
coverage of the Hotels Agreement is 100%. This is mainly explained by several 
interrelated factors: the economic relevance of the tourism sector in the region 
(and the negative impact of a sector strike), the prioritization of companies in 
having a quality tourism sector and the involvement of the regional government 
in achieving this goal. 
However, it is common for chambermaids to be covered by the cleaning sector 
agreement (generally with worse conditions to the hotel agreements) or by 
company agreements, especially usual in the case of facility management 
companies. The employers representation states that workers must be ascribed to 
the collective agreements to which their companies belong. Thus, arguing that it 
is not their responsibility that the cleaning agreement is more economically 
restrictive because they have not negotiated it. Currently this situation is 
denounced and being evaluated in the courts because the law requires workers to 
apply the agreement of the main company, so the court must decide whether the 
main company is the company that employs or in which the activity is developed. 
However, the business representation recognizes that there are companies in the 
sector that have not acted correctly. That is, outsourcing makes sense because 
flexibility is needed and not all companies have done so with that objective, but 
to reduce labor costs (paying less through the arbitrary application of collective 
agreements): "I cannot assure that all companies are complying with the law.” 
CC.OO. and UGT unions point out outsourcing strategy of many hotels with 
chambermaids regularly follows two steps: First, they launch collective dismissal 
plans of chambermaids. Second, the service is outsourced, usually to facility 
management companies (in some cases belonging to the same business group as 
the hotels), applying then a company level agreement substandard to the hotel 
agreements. In 2014 there was a ruling by the National Court (July 15, 2014), ruling 
on the case of NH Hoteles, which considered the outsourcing of productive 
activities as a way of reducing economic costs (thus justifying the implementation 
of collective dismissals). In this way, the large hotel chains began to outsource 
chambermaids through facility management companies. "There are already hotels 
where the only one that is not outsourced is the manager", says a representative 
of CC.OO union. 
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Since the unions complain that this strategy often involves an illegal cession of 
workers agreed with workers committees composed and managed by the 
company itself. Situations that, in any case, have been annulled by justice. 
However, the unions claim that these facility management companies are 
applying in the sector company agreements that are already repealed or 
challenged, a difficult situation to monitor due to the lack of information of Labor 
Inspectors and the unions themselves on the agreements applied in each 
company. 
Not only unions, but also business persons denounce this situation: "No one can 
believe that the viability of the hotel sector depends on paying more or less to 
chambermaids per room cleaned. It depends on the occupancy rate" (Manager of 
Human Resources of Facility Management Company). This interviewee points 
out that the outsourcing of hotel cleaning allowed hotels to go from having fixed 
costs to variable costs (e.g. the suppliers charge for cleaned rooms), but "hotels 
and companies crossed the line, constituting their own agreements to make 
chambermaids miserable". 
 
1.4. Recommendations 
 
Social actors show various initiatives and recommendations in relation to 
outsourcing. From the employers side, the recommendations focus mainly on 
outsourcing being used exclusively when the company seeks flexibility and not 
cheapening costs (despite the fact that justice contemplates this possibility). 
However, the main strategy proposed by employers is to improve the mechanisms 
that allow greater functional versatility: if the same person could perform any of 
the six tasks of a hotel (reception, cleaning, cooking, maintenance and 
complementary services), outsourcing would decrease. In fact, the last agreement 
allows this in part, as long as the workers always maintain their professional level. 
"The versatility is one of the solutions to outsourcing to adapt to changing demand." 
For its part, the trade union CC.OO. details various initiatives to improve the 
working conditions of outsourced employees in hotels and, specifically, of the 
chambermaids: 
 To establish in the Hotel Sector Agreement that those central activities 
cannot be outsourced: chambermaids, kitchen, reception and 
administration. And in the case of outsourcing, the sectorial agreement for 
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the hotel industry (state, regional or provincial) must be applied. This 
proposal is currently studied by employers associations, although various 
territories already implement it. 
 Perhaps the most innovative proposal by CC.OO. is the Seal of Quality of 
Fair and Socially Responsible Hotels. This is an initiative currently 
designed by FeS CC.OO. next to the University of Málaga and that has 
various criteria: outsourcing, respect for collective agreements, harassment, 
etc. The union believes that customers are increasingly sensitive to this 
type of aspect.  
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2. JOURNALISM: STORMS WITHIN THE CRISIS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The journalism faces several crisis: the digitalization is reframing the profession; the 
financing model has changed once the funding from advertising is decreasing and 
the economic crisis has affected the quantity and quality of work. Regarding the 
decline of incomes in newspapers and magazines in Spain, this is due to the 
decrease of buyers during the crisis, but most of all because advertising revenues 
have decreased drastically during the crisis. Advertising revenues in Spanish daily 
press were 1849 million euros in advertising in 2007, reducing to 523 in 2017. Total 
advertising revenues (considering also the growth for digital press) decreased by 
59% in that period. 
In this changing environment, some of the most relevant newspapers and 
magazines worldwide are rethinking their business model diversifying their 
income sources beyond advertising to counteract. However, the three crises 
together have accelerated the impact over journalists’ jobs, not only increasing 
unemployment levels but also weakening employment relations with 
organizational practices as outsourcing. 
 
2.2. Outsourcing within the journalism: The self-employed  
 
Officially, the journalism is the professional activity consisting in the collection and 
periodic treatment of information in many forms. Considering the wide range of 
profiles within the activity, for this research we are focusing mainly on press, but 
also digital media, TV, and radio. It is difficult to calculate today the number of 
journalists working in Spain. Other countries such as France require association in 
order to develop the activity, unlike Spain. In addition, official statistical sources do 
not include a fully disaggregated category for journalism. Neither official surveys 
provide a number of journalists to estimate the number of professionals in Spain 
adequately: Active Population Survey (EPA) collected 181 journalists in 2016, 
derived from the intersection between the occupation "Writers, journalists and 
linguists" and five economic activities linked to written, digital and audiovisual 
media. 
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The most accurate and reliable statistical information to which we can turn is the 
annual report of the journalistic profession (Informe anual de la profesión 
periodística) carried out by the Press Association of Madrid (Asociación de la 
Prensa de Madrid) for the completely Spanish territory12. Although this report 
does not intend to estimate the exact number of professionals in Spain, it does 
offer an annual overview of their socio-demographic profile, their employment 
conditions and the characteristics of the organizations in which they work. In 
reference to the companies themselves, we observe the change produced by the 
digitization of the sector in the distribution of journalists according to the type of 
media in which they work: more than 40% of journalists in 2016 worked in digital 
media (Graph 13). 
Graph 13. Distribution of journalist in relation to type of media (2016)3 
 
Source: Informe Anual de la profesión periodística (2017) 
Regarding the socio-demographic profile of journalists, although before the crisis 
journalism was a profession with a slightly higher proportion of men (57,1% in 
2007), the proportion of women has grown during the crisis (47,1% in 2016). 
Collective redundancies during the crisis may affect to a larger number of older 
journalists (most of them men), abandoning journalism. In a certain way, it 
decreases the proportion of men, as well as the greater relative number of women 
who during the crisis have begun to work in journalism. This gradually 
feminization of the activity is seen by some social actors as symptomatic of the low 
                                                          
1 Further information: https://www.apmadrid.es/publicaciones/informe-anual-de-la-profesion/ 
2 Catalan association of journalist (Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya) has developed similar studies 
at regional level with the “Llibre blanc de la professió periodística a Catalunya”. 
3 This information includes journalists who can work in one or more media. 
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wages within the sector. 
 
2.2.1. The influence and development of outsourcing in journalism 
The first milestone of outsourcing practices in printed media in Spain consisted in 
the contract out of the printing houses during the 80s. The main newspapers began 
to detach from their printers, arguing causes of profitability and efficiency. 
Outsourcing in audiovisual media also dates back to that time that began to 
subcontract a good part of their activities with the emergence of digitalisation and 
the increasing of telecommunications (Palacio 2018). The economic crisis supposed 
a significant job destruction for Spanish media, entailing at least 12.200 jobs 
destroyed in the period 2008 - 2015. A relevant number considering that currently 
9.200 journalists work in the main public and private communication groups 
(Palacio 2018). Consequences did not imply only employment destruction, but a 
fragmentation of employment relations through outsourcing practices. The most 
common pattern of outsourcing within the sector is the self-employment, called 
generally “collaborators”. 
Graph 14. Share of self-employed journalists in 2007 and 2016. 
 
Source: Informe Anual de la profesión periodística (2008 and 2017) 
While in 2007, 87,8% of journalists were salaried employees, this figure decreased 
to 73,2% in 2016, working the remaining 26.8% as self-employed. According to the 
Given the sample used (mostly associated journalists) the self-employed workers 
are probably underrepresented, estimating that the actual ratio is 60-65% of 
employees compared to a 40-35% of self-employed (Palacio 2018). Likewise, 78% of 
these self-employed workers declare to be obligated to work as “collaborator”. 
Regarding their relation with companies, the 20% of the “collaborators” work for 
only one company and more than 19% is integrated in their company client (thus, 
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bogus self-employment). Even those who “collaborate” with some companies 
(41,50%), the most have a main client depending financially on them (APM 2016). 
Therefore, generally “collaborators” generally work mainly or only for one client, 
thus, their employer in fact. However, in the latter there is a tendency to diversify 
the number of clients to increase or maintain income. 
In general, these “collaborators” reproduce the same role as internal workers, 
following the same organizational guidelines and even in many cases attending 
their work place daily in client organizations. However, depending on the period, 
the client media are reluctant of these practices due to periodical reportings of 
collaborators once their services are no longer required. In these cases, these 
external workers usually win the trials compensating them as internal workers 
given the accumulation of evidence (same monthly income on a regular basis, 
assistance to their workplaces, accredited access to facilities, cards accreditations as 
a member of the media, emails that show guidelines in the organization of work by 
the media, etc.). 
Graph 15. Distribution self-employed journalists regarding their dependency relation with 
clients (2016) 
 
Source: Informe Anual de la profesión periodística (2017) 
In that sense, the journalism shows scenarios of outsourcing of the core activity of 
the company. In the specific case of the media, it is the large print media, together 
with the magazines, which proportionally show a greater degree of outsourcing. 
The latter usually show the same model: a minimum core of internal personnel 
that manages the medium and an extensive network of external collaborators. 
Similarly, many regional and local television stations (especially public ones) also 
outsource core departments such as news bulletin to external producers. 
According to social actors consulted, Media usually establish unilaterally 
conditions of “collaborators”. In many cases, these conditions do not follow a 
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common pattern, but varying according to one collaborator or another. In addition, 
one of the main problems faced by these self-employed workers is to be outside the 
system. Not only are they out of the workforce of the medium, but often they are 
even outside the self-employed regime because their monthly income is not enough 
to pay taxes. Therefore, the main strategy is usually to accumulate bills and register 
in the social security regime for just one month. 
A common practice during the crisis period was that the media themselves expelled 
part of their staff and at the same time asking them to continue to work as self-
employed. Also, less usually, urging them to create on their own initiative a limited 
labor society (operating in a similar way to a cooperative) to continue working for 
them externally. In that way, this company develops the activity as an external 
provider of information editing services to the client / employer organization. That 
is, the media is generating its own supplier, working as parallel company to 
contract journalists reducing costs. Usually, agreements between the client 
organizations (public and private media) and their "parallel companies" are annual 
for a certain price, to distribute it among workers/partners. Likewise, in these 
situations, media urge to outsourced workers not to request support to unions in 
the constitution of these organizations. 
Regarding the remuneration of these self-employed workers, 43% earn less than 
1000 euros per month, as reported in the Journalistic Profession Report (Palacio 
2018). Likewise, on average, outsourced journalists earn € 7,5 to € 12 per page, 
depending on the media, with a delay of 45 days on average (Mèdia.cat 2017). In 
any case, all journalism workers’ salaries regulated in collective agreements were 
reduced during the crisis (17% between 2010 and 2015). Although, increasingly, the 
worker's salary is something negotiated privately between journalists and 
companies (Palacio 2018). 
 
2.3. Representation of workers and employers in journalism 
 
At national level, main trade union organizations in the representation of 
journalism workers are: 
 The Federation of Citizen Services of Workers' Commissions (Federación de 
Servicios a la Ciudadanía de Comisiones de Obreras - FSC-CC.OO.), 
Specifically the area dedicated to Media, Arts, Culture and Sport within the 
federation (with a group specifically for journalism). 
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 The Federation of Services, Mobility and Consumption of the General Union 
of Workers (Federación de Servicios, Movilidad y Consumo de la Unión 
General de Trabajadores - UGT-SMC), which has an area organized for 
Media and Culture (also with a group specifically for journalism). 
 The Federation of Journalists' Unions (Federación de Sindicatos de 
Periodistas  - FeSP), made up of various professional unions specifically of 
journalists from different regions of Spain. 
The FeSP considers that largerst unions in Spain (CC.OO. and UGT) have not 
historically paid attention to journalism and their professional rights. Thus, they 
justify the emergence of the FeSP as a willingness to represent both union and 
professional journalists. Nonetheless, CC.OO. highlights that not only do they 
represent journalism in the negotiations of the media sector, but also defend their 
deontological and professional rights through a group of journalists within the 
Federation dedicated specifically to these aspects. In any case, the affiliation among 
journalists is very low, barely 10%, falling to practically zero levels in terms of 
outsourced workers. CCOO representatives explain the low affiliation is due to 
journalists tend not to consider themselves workers but freethinking professionals, 
considering union affiliation as a contradiction with their journalistic impartiality. 
There is a tendency within journalism to join professional associations without the 
capacity to act in collective bargaining processes, but they play an important role in 
the professional defence of journalism and in the provision of services. This is the 
case mainly of the Federation of Associations of Journalists in Spain (Federación de 
Asociaciones de Periodistas en España - FAPE), composed of professional 
associations of different regions and/or specialisations. According to the director of 
FAPE, the main objective of the associations that make up the FAPE is to ensure the 
protection of journalism as a public service, which implies, among other objectives, 
the protection of the rights of journalism professionals. 
From CCOO point to a problem of organizational fragmentation due to the 
multitude of organizations representing professionals and / or union journalists. In 
any case, many of these organizations coordinate among themselves in the Forum 
of Journalist Organizations (FOP). However, from the FAPE they insist that this 
lack of organizational aggregation makes sense as union organizations focus on the 
labor rights and professionals on the deontology. 
With regard to business representation, the Media Association (Asociación de 
Medios de Información - AMI) is the main organization that plays the role of 
companies interlocutor of the media both in collective bargaining as employer 
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association and in defending the interests of the sector. Among its partners are the 
main Spanish media. It has more than 80 national and regional media, general and 
sports media, which daily carry out in Spain the research, coverage and 
dissemination of national and international news events in the digital and paper 
format. 
 
2.4. Collective agreement(s) and bargaining coverage in journalism 
 
Under the economic activity of daily press edition (NACE 5813). The Register of 
Collective Agreements of Spain includes 95 different collective agreements 
published in the period 2011 - 2019, mostly company agreements. There are cases 
of multiple company level agreements as happens with Unidad Editorial, with four 
different active collective agreements (each one for a different type of information 
and publication within the company). This emphasises the high level of 
fragmentation in the negotiation processes within the sector. 
However, there is a "collective agreement for the daily press sector" at national 
level, negotiated between the Association of Spanish Newspaper Publishers 
(currently the AMI), and the unions CC.OO.-FSC, UGT-FesMC and FeSP. The level 
of coverage of this agreement is low, since it serves as a minim standards 
framework for collective bargaining at company level. However, the workers' 
representatives point out that, since the labor reform of 2013, the company 
agreements worse the state sectoral agreement. There are similar dynamics in 
regional agreements, as is the case in Catalonia. 
Concerning the outsourced workers, they are excluded from any type of coverage 
of collective bargaining since they mostly work as "collaborators", that is, self-
employed workers. This scenario of lack of coverage generates situations of low(er) 
retributions, continuous availability and insecurity. No clauses in company or 
sectoral agreements refers to their situation. However, in the negotiating processes, 
it is usually a present issue. Before the crisis, there were practices of "regularization" 
(transfer from external to internal) of a part of collaborators in the signing of 
company agreements. However, these practices are nonexistent today in a scenario 
of continuous collective dismissals plans in the daily press sector. With regard to 
outsourced workers from “parallel companies” (cooperatives of external journalists 
that previously were working internally in client media), it is a common practice to 
apply them national sectoral agreement, once it is generally worse than company 
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ones. 
To remedy this situation, the workers' representatives consider that the agreements 
(of the company or even the sectoral agreement) should accept the existence of 
outsourcing and regulate it. Alternatively, to create a parallel agreement of 
collaborators to apply minimum standards. The AMI (employer association) 
refuses to regulate this matter, considering it irregular to establish a price for the 
service provided by an external supplier. In fact, the Professional Association of 
Journalists of Catalonia was fined € 30.000 by the judicial system for publishing 
guidelines for the monetary amount that a freelance journalist should request, 
considering that this practice contradicted respect for the free market. 
As an alternative, the Forum of Organizations of Journalists (FOP), where CCOO, 
UGT and FeSP are integrated, is promoting the reform of the "Press Law" (1966), to 
regulate the rights and duties of journalists, and entrepreneurs of the media, but 
also to introduce the regulation of collaborators (remuneration, payment 
guarantees, breaks, holidays, occupational health, etc.). The current regulation of 
this figure in the press law comes from a context in which collaborators were media 
icons earning significant amounts of money. Nothing to do currently with the 
precarious situation of the outsourced journalists. 
Beyond this strategy, the challenges to improve the situation of outsourced workers 
happens, on the one hand, to have a better knowledge about them, that is, how 
many of them are there, where they are, for whom they work and under what 
conditions. Moreover, on the other hand, mobilize salaried journalists for the rights 
of collaborators, as well as to prevent outsourcing in the media in which they work.  
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3. FACILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANY: MULTISERV4 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Multiserv is a multinational company with more than 100 years and with presence 
in Europe, Asia, America and Australia. In Spain, the company covers the entire 
national territory and offers all necessary services in facilities (cleaning, contract 
catering, security, maintenance, office ancillary activities, etc.). Companies can 
contract one or several services supplied by Multiserv, even they can outsource their 
integrated management to the company. 
The Spanish subsidiary of Multiserv was formed in 1999, starting with several 
purchase agreements, mainly with regional cleaning companies, in order to break 
in the national market of outsourced services (14 acquisitions in four years) to 
finally acquire the largest cleaning company in Spain in 2004, covering through all 
regions of the Spanish market. Between 2005 and 2006, Multiserv started 
incorporating gardening and technical maintenance companies (particularly 
plagues control companies), and from 2007 until today contact catering companies, 
integrating more than 50 companies (Graph 16), most of them at regional level (33). 
Graph 16. Sectoral distribution of companies acquired by Multiserve since 1999. 
 
Source: Official data provided by the firm (2018) 
Currently, Multiserv has around 30.000 employees in Spain, representing this 
workforce more than 80% of the company costs, showing the intensive nature of 
the activities developed by the company. In relation to its distribution, 79% of 
workers are women, with a drastically unequal proportion of the working day in 
                                                          
4 Multiserv is a fictional name in order to preserve anonymity and confidentiality of key informants 
interviewed, also stressing the fact it is not important the company itself but its context and practices. 
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relation to sex (Graph 17). Union representatives explain this inequality not only 
because of the feminization of the company's activities (especially industrial 
cleaning), but also because of the concentration of men in those more qualified 
categories, with greater responsibility and with greater technological management. 
Concerning stability, the share of temporary contracts is marginal (around 5%) to 
cover substitutions, explained by the effect of subrogation clauses. 
Graph 17. Partial time distribution in relation to sex (2017) 
 
Source: Data provided by workers representative’s committee members (2018) 
 
3.2. Business strategy and organization 
 
3.2.1. Business strategy; focus on cost reduction strategies vs quality 
Multiserv provides and manages all the general services that a facility or company 
may require. In this sense, the strategy of the company is to offer these services in a 
comprehensive way to their clients, not only supplying these services, but 
coordinating between them and the core activity of clients’ organizations. The 
official strategy of Multiserv focuses on offering comprehensive services through 
the implementation of standard business processes at global level that allow to 
client organizations to forecast provider performances. Official discourse of the 
company argues the knowledge of the different industries as factor to offer 
solutions to the diverse needs of clients, providing added value. However, it is also 
accurate to say the many acquisitions of the company have allowed expanding 
activities and areas covered, accessing new markets in Spain. 
The company argues, "People are not our best asset, they are our only asset”. We 
only have the daily work of our people in our clients' homes" (Personnel 
Coordinator).  Therefore, the firm insists in the idea that they do not compete in 
100%
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lower prices, but in added value strategies. In addition, the firm strategy aims at 
large clients, even specializing in global coverage: provision of all outsourced 
services in all geographies to the same global client, emphasizing this product as 
the differential element of the company. Regarding “matrioska” practices, Multiserv 
also outsources certain services, but in a very low percentage (mainly in activities 
with technical specifications such as maintenance of elevators). 
 
3.2.2. Organizational structure 
About its structure, the company is organized into several divisions (a large 
division, three specialized services divisions and a smaller division) taking in 
consideration the activity developed but also the type of client: 
 Large accounts division, which handles large multi-site contracts. Due to its 
size, this division is divided into two: a section dedicated to business clients 
in IT and another section dedicated to clients in the industrial sector. 
 The three divisions of specialized services: 
o Cleaning services division, which is also divided geographically into 
two due to business volume: South and North. 
o Maintenance services division. 
o Contract catering division. 
 Multiserv Direct, a division that provides services to very small clients. Due 
their size, these clients are attended with a different organization suited to 
their needs (e.g. Although large clients such as banks are served by the 
division of large accounts, the network of offices is serviced by "Multiserve 
Direct"). 
In this regard, Multiserv presents an innovative human resources management 
model: When it started, the company had a classic personnel management 
department (HR Manager, administrative staff who performed payroll, hiring, 
training and selection tasks, etc.). A few years ago, ISS changed the model and 
decided to have a manager (called labor manager) for every 200 to 300 people who 
would be responsible of these employees. Thus, that person performs all the 
personnel management tasks only for a specific amount of workers, being 
responsible of them, attending them personally, even establishing a personal 
relationship between the worker and the company (as argued by Personnel 
coordinator interviewed). 
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3.3. Characteristics of clients 
 
As already highlighted, the main strategy of the firm is to focus on large clients 
and large contracts in every dimension (duration, areas and services). In that 
sense, the star product of the company is the IFS (integrated facility service), that 
means taking control of the department of general services of a client company. 
Multiserv is focused on developing this line of business, due there are not many 
more firms in able to provide all services throughout the Spanish territory. 
Regarding the characteristics of clients, Multiserv provides services to very diverse 
organizations. “All clients are good and we can serve them all”, affirms the 
Personnel Coordinator interviewed. In Spain, around 30% of clients are within the 
public sector. In recent years, the public client usually contracts in competitive 
tenderings. Moreover, the “Disindexation” law of the Spanish Economy, 
approved in 2015, disconnects the consumer prices index to any operation in 
which any organism of the public sector takes part, with the consequent impact 
over collective bargaining and salaries of workers providing services to public 
clients. Therefore, once this law does not allow a revision of public contracts terms 
based, Multiserv prefers private clients, which allows transparent negotiations of 
contract terms, as argued by the company. Taking that in consideration, the 
sectors of the main private clients are: 
- Health (here there are also public clients), providing cleaning and contract 
catering services. 
- Commerce sector, working in shopping centres and large supermarket chains. 
- IT sector. 
- Financial sector. 
- Industrial and pharmaceutical sector. 
Regarding the service provided, the company insists on the idea that they supply 
“facility services, which also includes facility management. Multiserv have both, 
global contracts in which the totality of outsourced services from one client are 
developed by Multiserv, and also regional contracts. Some companies hire their 
services only for certain regions of the world. Although, there is an increasing 
tendency for multinationals to contract global supplier packages. These are very 
complex contracts that are sometimes negotiated for years, where clients seek 
mainly cost reductions and a single and uniform management model for their 
complementary services, but also an improvement in efficiency and a transference 
of the social risk linked to these activities (as argued by Multiserv firm 
representative). 
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The company assume in many cases its role as “protector” of the brand of its 
clients: "The quality in the facilities of a client is important for the brand of that 
company, but also important for the attraction and retention of human capital" 
(Personnel coordinator). In other cases, outsourced activities have even an 
important influence on the clients’ core business, such as the case of hospitals 
(supplying cleaning and disinfection, contract catering for patients, etc.). In this 
regard, the firm assume they generally maintain a classic B2B relationship with 
clients’ organizations, but with the special condition that they work at clients' 
houses, and moreover considering they are usually one of the main suppliers. 
Workers representatives recognize there are cases of interference by client 
organizations in the management and recruitment of workers. In those cases, the 
company is in the dilemma of developing practices of illegal cession of workers 
or losing contracts with clients. Faced with these possible situations of conflict, the 
union tries to mediate to find agreements between the three actors. 
 
3.4. Collective bargaining and workers’ representation 
 
Regarding company statement, the appropriate sectoral agreement covers every 
activity supplied by Multiserv, an information confirmed by the president of the 
union council of the company at Spanish level (UFM1): “The Company is one of 
the good ones”, comparing to usual bad practices of other facility management 
firms. Therefore, this appropriate agreement application is the case of industrial 
cleaning with the provincial or regional sectoral agreement and contract catering, 
gardening or security with their corresponding national agreements. 
Moreover, the company plays an important role in the bargaining of these 
agreements through employers’ associations, but also through network 
interactions. Thus, the Personnel Coordinator recognizes that many sectoral 
negotiations are unlocked with informal calls with social actors to mediate 
between them: “We are active in collective bargaining processes in every way” 
(Multiserv Personnel Coordinator). 
Regarding company level, Multiserv have two company agreements: 
 The “Multiserv collective agreement on information services and access 
control” covers activities such as the information and control on access in 
private areas or in places of restricted circulation, as well as internal post 
services. These activities are not regulated at sectoral level, but the company 
affirms to encourage negotiation at that level (that only exists in the region of 
Navarra). Multiserv is not the only firm regulating at company level this 
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activity (most of them FM companies). The agreement specifically settles that 
any is excluded activity that may fit into another sectoral agreement. 
Therefore, activities such as chambermaids cannot be covered by this 
agreement (regulated by the hotels agreement), although FM companies do 
so. 
 The “Collective agreement of the personnel of structure of Multiserv” 
(currently in process of renegotiation), aimed to regulate the administrative 
staff and management of the company (around 800 in Spain). There are 
sectoral collective agreements that regulate offices activity at regional level. 
However, this company agreement improves in general the sectoral one. 
 
There have been also several work center agreements, but most of them before 
2012 labor law reform, thus, before company agreements could downgrade 
sectoral agreements. Regarding the possibility of an own company agreement for 
all activities delivered, the company argues that sectoral agreements fit better for 
intensive activities, in which the workforce is the main cost and it also represents 
the essence of the service. Also due to the fact that Multiserv deny the possibility 
to compete with other FM firms with working conditions downgrade through 
company agreements. In this regard, about the possibility of launching a general 
collective agreement for all activities supplied by FM companies, thus 
implementing a “sectoral” agreement (explained in section I.3.1.), Multiserv was 
opposed to that process. Even, the firm has stopped using the term “facility 
management” because they refuse to be linked with outsourcing practices in 
production lines at “crushing” prices. Their opposition reach at that level that they 
were not invited to take part in the FM employer association articulation. 
According to the works council, the main conflicts that workers representatives 
have faced in Multiserv during the years of crisis have not been so much due to 
coverage problems derived from outsourcing practices, but from 
“internalization”. That is, restructuring processes of client companies in which 
they try to internalize outsourced activities to preserve the employment of internal 
workers. Several cases of this type of important scope in Spain have affected 
workers of Multiserv, scenarios in which Multiserv has mediated between workers 
of the client company and its own workers. 
In relation to the composition of work councils, Multiserv have several work 
councils in Spain (the main one in Madrid) that has representation in the European 
work council. The company insists in its good relationship with workers 
representative, having generally common interests about workers rights and 
respecting their role because “power tends to abuse and it is good for workers to 
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organize and defend themselves against abuses” (Personnel coordinator). In that 
way, Multiserv has an attitude fulfilling with every agreement and regulation 
before to be claimed by public organisms or unions: "If you have to pay it, you 
pay. To take profit by deceiving the weakest is to steal and abuse power. That is 
why the unions give us an example”. Multiserv gives as example of this good 
relationship the social foundation of the company, that finances labor insertion 
projects in those third world countries from which most of migrant workers of the 
company come from (e.g. Ecuador). CCOO and UGT (the main unions in the 
committee) are members of the board. “The unions do not donate their initials free 
of charge”, affirms the Personnel coordinator. This can benefit to Multiserv in the 
face of the client, showing social peace within the company. Likewise, unions 
usually call Multiserv personnel coordinator when they have conflicts with a client 
and transfers for undertakings are considered. 
 
3.5. Strategies developed by social partners in order to solve / cope with 
coverage problems 
First strategy of Multiserv in order to guarantee social protection of workers is to 
apply always the appropriate sectoral agreement of each activity developed. This 
adequate application of sectoral agreement reaches all points: the company has a 
division to employ people with disabilities5, workers covered by the adequate 
sectoral agreement of the activity they develop. On the contrary, most FM 
companies apply the Special Employment Companies Agreement, specific for this 
social collective of workers and with worse employment conditions. 
In that sense, the firm highlights the fact that its way to compete is not decreasing 
salaries of their workers, but improving work organization and added value 
strategies. In addition, due to social responsibility issues, that are step by step 
more important for consumers. The consumer will base its consumption based on 
social criteria such as respect for people, as happens in other countries. This is 
already beginning to happen in the textile sector and, regarding outsourced 
services, it will happen with hotels and their abuses with chambermaids" 
(Personnel coordinator). 
 In addition, regarding collective bargaining itself, Multiserv does support the 
possibility of a large association of ancillary services that may bring together 
                                                          
5 Spanish legislation obligates to any company or public organization bigger than 50 workers to 
have at least a 2% of employees with disabilities. 
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employers of cleaning, gardening, contract catering and others facility services, 
because the interests are common, the interlocutors are the same and the 
challenges are similar. This should be promoted first from Cleaning sector, 
constituting a national agreement, with territorial specifications. And then, 
expanding the activity scope of this agreement introducing other ancillary 
activities. However, there are many difficulties due to opposed interests: the 
regional unions want to maintain regional collective bargaining to maintain its 
activity, just like the lawyers and counselors of the Employers who also have their 
main activity with regional agreements. And also, due to employers strategies to 
fragment workers organization. 
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SECTION III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Regulatory mechanisms at sectoral level such as the implementation of 
subrogation clauses seem good practices both to guarantee coverage and to 
protect employment conditions of outsourced workers. However, outsourcing 
forms like self-employment does not allow its application. In this sense, the study 
of the phenomenon of outsourcing shows that it is essential to focus its analysis 
and its regulation taking into account not only the sector but also the activity and 
main occupation of these outsourced workers. This is the case of the 
chambermaids, who have notable differences in terms of the degree and impact 
of outsourcing in their occupation. Or journalists, where there are different 
dynamics depending on the type of media or specific occupation, with a special 
impact of outsourcing on information editors (once their off-site activity 
development), tending to bogus self-employment practices. This is also the case 
of workers employed by facility management companies, whose outsourced 
situation is strongly related to the value that companies decide to give to the 
content of their work, and not so much to a truly auxiliary nature, as is the case of 
chambermaids, whose activity is central in hotels sector. 
Taking these aspects into account, it is worth pointing out which are the strategies 
and recommendations that are extracted from the study in order to improve the 
coverage of collective bargaining in cases of outsourcing in order, ultimately, to 
improve the working conditions of these workers. These strategies are generally 
of a regulatory nature, although some point to aspects of an organizational nature, 
while others take a non-legal institutional path. 
The subrogation of the personnel in the work centers is repeatedly mentioned as 
one of the main measures of social protection of the outsourced employees, not 
only in what refers to the important stabilization of workers in case of transfer of 
companies, but in the maintenance of certain social benefits acquired. Although it 
is a circumstance that is often quickly assumed by workers, social agents point to 
subrogation as an element of stability, not only labor, but also organizational. 
However, this type of clause usually has impediments for its application in the 
case of off-site activities, since it usually implies geographical mobility in the 
national territory for workers, and even international if they carry out offshoring 
practices. In addition, they are usually clauses only applicable to personnel with 
a certain career length. 
About proposals, unions suggest the amendment of Article 41 of the Workers' 
Statute so that when it is outsourced, the agreement of the main company is always 
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applied. This proposal was blocked at the time by the Popular Government of Rajoy 
and has been maintained so by the Socialist Government of Sanchez. The unions 
consider that their blockade is because it would affect public budgets: the Public 
Administration is the main customer of outsourced services. However, some public 
administrations do show initiatives to protect outsourced workers. This is the case 
of the Barcelona City Council, making a social assessment of its suppliers and 
giving a weighted weight of 30% to social criteria and 70% to economic criteria. 
Thus, if the City Council finds that the price offered is abnormally low (and 
therefore implies the payment of wages below the agreement conditions) said offer 
will be excluded. 
In that sense, it would be opportune to consider this type of mechanism in all 
administrations. One way would be through the Administrative Contracting Board 
of the State. This body makes both recommendations and instructions to 
administrations regarding the public procurement of third parties. One of the 
mechanisms of this meeting is precisely the establishment of a series of 
requirements for companies that are hired (from a certain amount in the works and 
services contracts). These requirements are mainly of a financial nature, although 
we understand that, following the example of the Barcelona City Council, it is 
necessary to introduce new requirements to companies in what refers mainly to the 
application of the collective agreements that come, realizing that a prior social 
evaluation. This board has parallel bodies in the regional administrations, which 
would make it possible to generalize these requirements in the concession of 
exploitation of public services, thus facilitating a substantive improvement in the 
fulfilment of certain minimums in terms of the quality of outsourced employment. 
We understand that this type of mechanisms are not possible once the business 
relation is between private entities. This is where the role of collective bargaining 
at the sectoral level can be reinforced, always considering the diverse impact of 
outsourcing in the different activities of a sector. The current regulations tend 
towards a decentralization of collective bargaining that puts outsourced 
employees in a situation of greater weakness, as they start from an organizational 
fragmentation that hinders collective coordination to articulate negotiation and 
mobilization processes (Drahokoupil 2015). The inapplicability of agreements 
that has become notable during the crisis comes, in part, from this type of 
situation. 
However, phenomena such as facility management companies currently pose a 
challenge for this type of mechanism, as they partially apply some or other 
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agreements based on economic criteria. That is, we find cases in which a facility 
management company supplies the entire package of outsourced services of a 
specific work center, leaving it to its discretion whether some occupations are 
covered by one or other agreements based generally on the salary level of an 
occupation and category concrete within each agreement. In this sense, it is 
paradigmatic that the selected company analysed is a case of good practices, 
mainly because of respecting labor regulation and collective agreements. An 
entrepreneurial attitude that starts from the basis of professionally recognizing 
outsourced workers and giving the same value to the content of their work as 
internal employees. 
In short, as stated by Grimshaw, Marchington, Rubery and Willmott (2005), a 
reconnection between employment and organizations is urgent, recognizing the 
development of work processes and, therefore, the status of worker for those 
organizations for which provides services. This means an equalization of the 
rights of outsourced and internal workers. In a more holistic way, we can 
consider not only employees, employers and clients, but also users, associated 
business groups and public administrations be taken into account regarding their 
potential role in the regulation of outsourcing.  
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List of Interviews6  7 
 
NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD 
Alberto Pastor Labor law expert in UAB (Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona) 
Fernando Rocha Researcher of Fundación 1º de Mayo 
Jordi García Viñas Industrial Relations Department Manager of CEOE 
(Confederación Española de Organizaciones 
Empresariales) 
 
HOTELS SECTOR 
Antonio Rudas National Coordinator of Hotels sector in FeS CC.OO. 
(Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras) 
Gonzalo Fuentes Institutional Relations responsible of FeS CC.OO. 
(Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras) 
Representative CEHAT (Confederación Española de Hoteles y 
Alojamientos Turísticos) 
Representatives Las Kellys Barcelona (Professional association of 
Chambermaids)8 
 
JOURNALISM9 
Agustín Yanel General Secretary of FeSP (Federación de Sindicatos de 
Periodistas) 
Diego Fco. Martínez 
Peinado 
RTVE Works council member – CC.OO. delegate 
Elsa González President of FAPE (Federación de Asociaciones de 
Periodistas de España) 
Fabián Nevado Labor adviser of SPC (Sindicat de Periodistes de 
Catalunya) 
Màxim Pujadé Coordinator of Media, Leisure, Culture and Sports in 
CC.OO. Catalunya 
 
                                                          
6 Several interviewees in sectoral studies prefer to maintain their anonymity. For Facility 
Management company study, that was the initial proposal to interviewees. 
7 Role and organizations are related to the time of the interviews (December 2017 – May 2018) 
8   Become as Trade Union federation of CNT after the interview. Therefore, for the content of 
this report, considered as professional association. 
9 Unsuccessful attempt to count with the participation of AMI (Asociación de Medios de 
Información), Spanish Employer Association of daily press 
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FACILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANY 
Manager Human Resources Area in FM company 
Representative CC.OO. member in Catalan works 
council of FM company 
Representative President of National works council of 
FM company 
 
